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Swanson: Phishing for Computer Fraud Insurance Coverage

PHISHING FOR COMPUTER FRAUD INSURANCE
COVERAGE
Stephen Swanson

INTRODUCTION
“Insurance is the only product that both the seller and buyer hope
is never actually used.”1 This quotation certainly has merit, but the
proliferation of technology in recent decades and the associated risks
to sensitive business data are making insurance coverage claims a
necessity as cyber threats continue to rise.2 Cyber threats involve
“persons who attempt unauthorized access to a [computer] system
device and/or network using a data communications pathway[, and]
[t]his access can be directed from within an organization by trusted
users or from remote locations by unknown persons using the
[i]nternet.”3 Cyber threats originate from many sources,4 but in the
insurance litigation arena, courts across the country are struggling to
interpret the proper coverage for monetary business losses pursuant
to phishing attacks.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to my family and friends
for your continued support over the past four years. Thank you to Professors Diamond and Bracker for
your guidance and feedback during the process of writing this Note. Finally, thank you to my Law
Review colleagues for your invaluable diligence in editing and publishing this note.
1. Life Insurance, SUMMIT FIN. CONSULTING, http://summitfc.net/services/insurance/life-insurance
[https://perma.cc/2JWP-FBYL] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (quoting unknown author).
2. J. Clement, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United States from
2005 to 2018 (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breachesrecorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/
[https://perma.cc/W398CJC5] (last updated Aug. 5, 2019) (“The number of data breaches and the number of exposed records in
the U.S. have reached the highest figures to date in 2017 [with] [n]early 179 million records . . . exposed
in the U.S. in 2017, whereas the number of data breaches in the country added up to 1,579 that year.”).
3. Cyber Threat Source Descriptions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND CISA CYBER + INFRASTRUCTURE,
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat-source-descriptions
[https://perma.cc/4NMX-S3EH]
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
4. Id. Various threats to computer systems include bot-network operators, criminal groups, foreign
intelligence services, hackers, insiders, phishers, spammers, spyware/malware authors, and terrorists. Id.
5. J. Robert MacAneney et al., 2 Circuit Court Rulings Rock Phishing Loss Coverage Field, LAW
360 (July 26, 2018, 3:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1067338/2-circuit-court-rulings-rockphishing-loss-coverage-field [https://perma.cc/NP4D-C5R3] (“[Recent] decisions create a bona fide
circuit split on the issue of whether a ‘phishing’ . . . scheme comes within the computer fraud coverage
part of a crime/fidelity policy.”).
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Generally, phishing entails “attempt[s] by an individual or group
to solicit personal information from unsuspecting users by employing
social engineering techniques [that] are crafted to appear as if they
have been sent from a legitimate organization or known individual.”6
Phishing attacks proceed quickly with minimal exposure to the
cybercriminal.7 For example, France-based Etna Industrie was
targeted when the company president contacted its accountant
regarding a “very confidential” acquisition of a company in Cyprus.8
The president instructed that a lawyer supporting the transaction
would make contact with details of where to wire the funds for the
purchase.9 Within one hour, and after about ten urgent emails and
several phone calls, the accountant had wired €500,000 to foreign
bank accounts.10 While the accountant seemingly acted in accordance
with the business’s needs, the president’s communication, the
external lawyer, and the confidential transaction were actually all a
fraudulent phishing attack aimed at rapidly excising funds from Etna
Industrie with little or no paper trail.11
Following a successful phishing attack, businesses seek to recoup
these losses and turn to their cyber insurance policy or the computer
fraud provision of their crime insurance policy.12 Oftentimes,
6. Report Phishing Sites, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY CISA CYBER + INFRASTRUCTURE,
https://www.us-cert.gov/report-phishing [https://perma.cc/CGL2-8J8P] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
Usually in the form of emails, phishing “often attempt[s] to entice users to click on a link that will take
the user to a fraudulent website that appears legitimate [or] to provide personal information, such as
account usernames and passwords, that can further expose them to future compromises.” Id. Accord
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Phishing: The Legal Challenges for Business, 24 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y REP. 2, 2 (2005) (“Phishing attacks take advantage of customer trust in a company’s identity and
brand names . . . [and] they do serious damage to the company’s reputation, as well as undermine
confidence in online commerce generally.”).
7. Marie Keyworth & Matthew Wall, The ‘Bogus Boss’ Email Scam Costing Firms Millions, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35250678 [https://perma.cc/ZKA4-MMX9].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Social Engineering Fraud, ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER & CO., https://www.wasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/20161219_ajgallagher_social_engineering_fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR2399XX] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Social Engineering Fraud] (“Many insureds assume that
theft of funds through social engineering fraud would be covered under a cyber liability policy or a
crime insurance policy’s computer/funds transfer fraud extension; however, insurers have generally
denied coverage under both policies.”).
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however, the insurer denies coverage under latter provisions, and
litigation ensues.13 Courts faced with this insurance coverage issue
are split on whether phishing attacks result in a direct loss of money
that should be covered under a computer fraud provision of a crime
insurance policy.14 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits side with the insurers
in denying coverage under similar computer fraud provisions.15 The
Second and Sixth Circuits have found direct losses and sustain
coverage in favor of the insureds, whereas the Eleventh Circuit is
divided.16
Accordingly, the following note discusses the disparity between
the federal circuit courts regarding the proper insurance coverage for
phishing-type attacks. Part I examines the cyber threats companies
face when handling sensitive transactions and customer data, as well
as the coverage gap between traditional crime insurance policies and
the targeted cyber insurance policies that help prevent, detect, and
ultimately mitigate the damages resulting from a cybersecurity
breach.17 Part II analyzes the current circuit split and the various

13. Id.
14. MacAneney, supra note 5.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2018);
Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 30, 2016); Success Healthcare v. Zurich Am. Ins., No. 9:14-81423-CIV, 2015 WL 11439019,
at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:14-CV-81423, 2015 WL
11438207 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2015).
17. Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security Insurance: Navigating the Landscape of a
Growing Field, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 379, 390–91 (2014) (“The various types
of coverage offered under cyber-security insurance policies include coverage for:

Data breach/privacy crisis management: expenses related to the management
of a cyber-security incident, including the investigation, remediation, data
subject notification, call management, credit checking for data subjects, legal
costs, court attendance and regulatory fines;

Business/Network Interruption: loss of net profit that was caused by a material
interruption to the insured’s network, due to a cyber-attack or a network
security breach;

Multimedia/Media liability: third-party damages which can include
defacement of a website, infringement of intellectual property rights or
negligence relating to electronic content;

Extortion liability: losses due to a threat of extortion and professional fees
related to terminating an external threat;

Network security liability: third-party damages resulting from denial of access
to a system, costs related to data stored with third-party suppliers and costs
related to the theft of data on third-party systems;
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contract interpretation strategies, policy considerations, and tests
employed in reaching a coverage decision. Part III proposes a
resolution to the overarching circuit split that will provide more
clarity and predictability to victims of phishing attacks and the
insurance companies they employ.
I. Background
Scams and schemes are not new phenomena in human history.18
They have traditionally varied in sophistication,19 but the rise of
cyber threats in recent years is so pervasive that the public likely has
already “been hacked” or they just “don’t [yet] know [that] they’ve
been hacked.”20 The insurance market responded to these threats in
1997 with its first iteration of cyber insurance policies.21 Initially
covering only third-party liability, insurers soon realized that a
significant amount of data breaches originated from within
companies, so the policies expanded in kind to include first-party
liability coverage to the affected company.22 Further developments in


Reputational Injury: third-party damages from disparagement or privacy
violations caused by breach of the insured’s system;

Conduit Injury: damages to customers’ systems affected by breach of the
insured’s system;

Disclosure Injury: damages to individuals caused by the unauthorized access
of their private information held on the insured’s system.”);
Jason Tashea, Are You Covered, 104 A.B.A. J. 30, 31 (2018) (discussing the insurance coverage gap
between law firm’s computer fraud coverage policy and general cyber insurance policies).
18. Linton Weeks, How Scams Worked in the 1800s, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 12, 2015, 7:03 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/npr-history-dept/2015/02/12/385310877/how-scams-worked-in-the-1800s
[https://perma.cc/ES9W-KQHT] (detailing “the Golden Age of schemes” and the rise of the so-called
“confidence man” or “con man”).
19. Jean Braucher & Barak Orbach, Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man, 27 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 249, 250 (2015) (“Familiar [con] examples include telemarketing frauds, fraudulent
charities, pyramid and Ponzi schemes, work-from-home schemes, quack medicines, home repair scams,
and Nigerian scams.”).
20. Barbarians at the Digital Gate, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323701904578275920521747756
[https://perma.cc/5U47-PQB5].
21. Brian D. Brown, The Ever-Evolving Nature of Cyber Coverage, INS. J. (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-features/2014/09/22/340633.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ABU-N7QS].
22. Id.
[T]he original policies covered only third party suits arising from breaches originating
from outside the company. However, studies at the time showed that over half of all
data breaches originated from inside the company from rogue and disgruntled
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the cyber insurance arena seemingly came about in response to
evolving cyber threats and businesses looking to be made whole for
revenue interruption, digital investigations, and public relations
expenses.23 Still, businesses struggle “to stay ahead of criminals and
stop old cat and mouse games” in an age when information security
is increasingly vulnerable.24 Targeted cyber threats, coupled with
limited options for business recovery, have created a gap that courts
nationwide are grappling to fill.
A. Cyber Threats
The social engineering attack is prominent among the cyber threats
facing businesses.25 This involves “manipulat[ing] . . . a victim’s
understanding
of
a
transaction . . . so
that
they
26
unwittingly . . . provide the thief with funds or information.” Under
the social engineering umbrella, group and spear phishing attacks
target businesses with demonstrated success.27
employees. The markets offering coverage at that time responded by broadening
coverage to cover loss to the entity, but coverage for loss from the malicious
employee was excluded.
Id.
23. Id.
24. COMBATING UNAUTHORIZED REMOTE NETWORK ACCESS AND EMBEDDED MALICIOUS CODE,
WARREN GORHAM & LAMONT, 2010 WL 865796.
25. PETER TRIM & DAVID UPTON, COUNTERACTING CYBER THREATS THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL
LEARNING AND TRAINING § 2.2 (2013) (ebook) (“Social Engineering has been defined in numerous
ways. The best definition is an enemy who manipulates or uses psychological tricks to gain the
confidence of an authorized network employee relying on the natural human tendency to trust and help
others. While there may be internal, disgruntled enemies within your organizational system, the external
enemy will, more than likely, use social engineering to terrorize your organization. These hackers will
rely on the fact that people within your organization are either willing to share private information or are
unaware of the value of information they possess and therefore are careless about protecting it.”).
26. Scott L. Schmookler & Christopher M. Kahler, Social Engineering: Is the Manipulation of
Humans a Computer Fraud?, 22 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 7 (2016).
27. CAROLE BASRI & MARY MACK, EDISCOVERY FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL § 30:10, § 30:11
(2018) (“Criminals often send . . . phishing emails by the thousands, which is referred to as group
phishing. A phishing email will generally claim that it is a well-known individual or organization (a
bank, a credit card company), which the target may or may not have a relationship with, that needs
certain access information, such as usernames, passwords, or anything else a criminal may need to gain
access to the system they are targeting. If an individual opens a file in the email or clicks on a link,
malware may be delivered to the system or the individual may be tricked into divulging system
credentials or other important information Unlike group phishing, spear phishing, like its name
suggests, is a targeted, individually designed, phishing attempt to gain access, or spread malware, to a
specific individual or entity. The goal of a spear phishing attack is frequently to steal intellectual
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1. Business Email Compromise
Business Email Compromise (BEC) is a type of spear phishing
attack where scammers target businesses that routinely send large
sums of money via wire transfer.28 Between October 2013 and
December 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported BEC
losses nearing $1.6 billion.29 The scam proceeds when a company
employee, usually in the accounting or finance department, is
contacted by a third-party posing as a high-ranking company
executive or trusted external vendor who requests a monetary wire
transfer to a new or slightly-different-than-normal bank account.30
The employee completes the transfer, and the company later
discovers that the internal executive or external vendor never
requested the transaction.31 All, or part, of the transferred funds are
typically unrecoverable from the third-party scammer, and the
company immediately looks to recover those losses.32

property, financial data, trade or military secrets, and other confidential data.”).
28. Lee Matthews, Phishing Scams Cost American Businesses Half a Billion Dollars a Year,
FORBES (May 5, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/05/05/phishingscams-cost-american-businesses-half-a-billion-dollars-a-year/#7b7879703fa1 [https://perma.cc/T28S9E56].
29. Id.
30. Jan Larson & Raymond Simmons, Favoring Coverage for Business Email Compromise Losses,
LAW 360 (Aug. 9, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1071615/favoring-coverage-forbusiness-email-compromise-losses [https://perma.cc/V7XK-K52K]. Accord Smedinghoff, supra note 6,
at 2 (“A phishing attack typically involves sending individuals an email request for information that
appears to come from a legitimate company, such as a bank, retailer, or other e-commerce Web site (the
spoofed company). Through the use of a false ‘from’ address, copies of company logos, Web links, and
graphics, these emails have the look and feel of a message that recipients might expect to receive from a
company with whom they do business. Often the message makes reference to new security measures
allegedly being undertaken by the spoofed company and asks recipients to verify or reconfirm
confidential personal information, such as account numbers, Social Security numbers, passwords, and
other sensitive information. To provide a sense of urgency, the message may indicate that the recipient’s
account will be suspended or cancelled if the information is not verified by a certain date.”).
31. Larson & Simmons, supra note 30. See also Thomas H. Bentz, Jr., Cyber Insurance and Social
Engineering Fraud, Why Voluntary Transfers May Not be Covered by Your Insurance Policies, 21
CYBERSPACE
LAW.,
no.
2,
Feb.
2016,
at
1,
1,
https://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Articles/0216_Bentz_CyberSpaceLawyer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JFS5-5GVA].
32. Larson & Simmons, supra note 30.
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Coverage Options
Apart from absorbing the loss, phished companies have limited
avenues to recover the fraudulently transferred funds.33 They may
look to the involved parties or even to the bank that facilitated the
transfer. If this fails, a claim may be tendered under a relevant
business insurance policy.
1. Between Parties
The involved parties may seek to recover the losses as between
themselves. In Bile v. RREMC, LLC, a $63,000 employment
discrimination settlement agreement was erroneously transmitted to a
third party posing as the plaintiff’s counsel.34 Unable to retrieve the
wire transfer, the payee refused to dismiss the employment
discrimination action until the payor initiated a second $63,000
payment.35 The payor refused as well, and both parties sought
resolution in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia as per the settlement agreement’s venue stipulation.36
Though the court ultimately held that no duplicate payment was due
because the plaintiff’s counsel failed to warn the opposing parties of
a known fraudulent email issue,37 the court interpreted common law
contract principles and Uniform Commercial Code Article 3
provisions to form the rule that “if a person has an obligation to
deliver a check, and does not deliver that check due to that person’s
own error, then that person remains liable on the underlying
obligation.”38 Consequently, the risk of loss remains with the payor
33. Larson & Simmons, supra note 30 (“The money from the transaction, of course, disappears and
is often unrecoverable from the third party that fraudulently induced the transfer.”).
34. Bile v. RREMC, LLC, No. 3:15CV051, 2016 WL 4487864, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2016).
35. Id. at *2.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *5, *11 (“Two days before the fraud was perpetrated on LeClairRyan, both Ubom and Bile
were aware that an unidentified third party had targeted the settlement funds for diversion to a Barclay’s
bank account that had nothing to do with Bile. Additionally, Bile and Ubom knew that
ubomlawgroup@yahoo.com was being used in an effort to perpetrate the fraud. Ubom failed to pass this
information along to Defendants, defense counsel, or the Court. This failure substantially contributed to
the loss of $63,000.00 within the meaning of U.C.C. § 3-406.”).
38. Id. at *10.
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in the context of hacked settlement agreements. The payor is also
unable to recover lost funds from the bank involved in a fraudulent
transfer.
2. Financial Institutions
The Uniform Commercial Code generally allocates the risk of loss
to banks that honored requests for fraudulent wire transfers.39 Yet,
banks oftentimes are not bound to reinstate lost funds when the “bank
and its customer agree to implement a security procedure designed to
protect themselves against fraud.”40 The risk of loss will shift to the
customer, that is, the party whose funds were fraudulently
transferred, when “the security procedure is a commercially
reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized
payment orders, and the bank proves that it accepted the payment
order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure.”41
With yet another recovery mechanism closed, companies look to
their individual insurance policies for repayment of the lost funds.
3. Cyber Insurance and Crime Insurance Policies
One source of insurance coverage may be a cyber risk policy,
though many U.S. businesses have not yet subscribed.42 For those
that have, a typical cyber insurance policy may not cover
“losses . . . where companies have funds, data, or intellectual
property stolen by computer hackers.”43 Instead, cyber policies tend
39. Banco Del Austro, S.A. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 215 F. Supp. 3d 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
40. Choice Escrow & Land Title, LLC v. BancorpSouth Bank, 754 F.3d 611, 617 (8th Cir. 2014).
41. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); see also Choice, 754 F.3d at
617, 622–23 (noting that BancorpSouth Bank was not required to replenish $440,000 in lost funds
because it maintained commercially reasonable “security procedures . . . [such as] password protection,
daily transfer limits, device authentication, and dual control” and “accepted and executed
the . . . payment order in a way that comported with [the customer’s] reasonable expectations, as
established by reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”).
42. Why 27% of U.S. Firms Have No Plans to Buy Cyber Insurance, INS. J. (May 31, 2017),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/05/31/452647.htm
[https://perma.cc/DE86LJ5B] (detailing that, despite an expected increase of cyber breaches in the next year, 50-55% of U.S.
firms do not have cyber risk insurance due in part to lack of clarity regarding cost and coverage).
43. Joseph S. Harrington, Cyber Losses Testing Insurance Policy Boundaries, INS. J. (Apr. 13,
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/04/13/447758.htm
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to focus on “provid[ing] . . . [consulting] resources to mitigate cyberfraud [sic].”44 Without a cyber policy specifically covering losses
from computer or funds transfer fraud, phished companies must
tender a claim under a more traditional insurance policy.45 Though a
crime insurance policy may seem like a logical source of coverage
after a phishing attack, the prevailing case law demonstrates that
courts differ on the interpretation of such provisions.46
II. Analysis
Federal circuit courts nationwide interpret crime insurance policies
differently.47 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits align with traditional
contract interpretation strategies or policy considerations to deny the
insured’s claim for coverage.48 The Second and Sixth Circuits focus
on the technical accomplishment of a phishing attack and apply that
process to the policy language in question, and ultimately in favor of
the insured.49 The Eleventh Circuit bases its rulings on the principles

[https://perma.cc/38SM-BAK5].
44. Id.; see also Garrie & Mann, supra note 17.
45. CyberRisk, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO. (2014), https://www.travelers.com/energy-practice/iwdocuments/CyberRiskBond-59784.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y3Z-TWNB]; see also Harrington, supra note
43.
46. See Social Engineering Fraud, supra note 12. Though it varies depending on the insurer, a
typical computer fraud provision of a crime insurance policy will pay the insured for the following:
the [i]nsured’s direct loss of, or direct loss from damage to, [m]oney, [s]ecurities, and
[o]ther [p]roperty directly caused by . . . [t]he use of any computer to fraudulently
cause a transfer of [m]oney, [s]ecurities, or [o]ther [p]roperty from . . . inside the
[p]remises . . . to a person . . . outside the [p]remises . . . or to a place outside the
[p]remises.
Posco Daewoo Am. Corp. v. Allnex USA, Inc., No. CV 17-483, 2017 WL 4922014, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct.
31,
2017);
see
also
BEAZLEY,
Crime
Insurance
Policy
3,
https://www.beazley.com/documents/Management%20Liability/Crime/Crime%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LKD5-XXZE ] (“‘Computer Fraud’ means the Theft of Money, Securities or
Merchandise by a Third Party, through the use of any Computer System.”); Social Engineering Fraud,
supra note 12 (“Under [a crime policy], the insurer pays the insured for a direct loss of money sustained
by the insured resulting from computer fraud committed by a third party.”).
47. MacAneney, supra note 5.
48. Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 259 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Taylor &
Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV 14-3608 RSWL (SHx), 2015 WL 3824130, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June
18, 2015), aff’d, 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017).
49. Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2018).
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of direct causation, but even these decisions are inconsistent.50 A
review of the federal circuit split is illustrative.
A. Phishing Attacks Are Not Covered
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits do not find coverage for phishing
attacks under a computer fraud provision of a crime insurance
policy.51 Both employ varying interpretative techniques to reach this
result.52 The Ninth Circuit clings to traditional insurance policy
guidelines, whereas the Fifth Circuit views insured responsibility as a
principle policy consideration.53 Despite their diverse analysis, the
insurer prevails in either circuit.54
1. Canons of Construction
In the Ninth Circuit, regardless of the claimed coverage provision,
fraudulent wire transfers do not constitute a direct loss by the
insured.55 In Taylor & Lieberman v. Federal Insurance Co., the
plaintiff, an accounting firm, held power of attorney to make
monetary wire transfers out of their client’s bank account.56 The
client sent three seemingly legitimate emails to the plaintiff
requesting over $320,000 in wire payments to bank accounts in
50. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2018);
Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2018); Success
Healthcare v. Zurich Am. Ins., No. 9:14-81423-CIV, 2015 WL 11439019, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20,
2015).
51. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4.
52. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 255; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *3.
53. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4.
54. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259; Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4.
55. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *3. The court bullet pointed the three provisions
under which plaintiff Taylor & Lieberman, an accounting firm, sought coverage:

Forgery Coverage: “The Company shall pay the Parent Corporation for direct
loss sustained by an Insured resulting from Forgery or alteration of a Financial
Instrument committed by a Third Party.”

Computer Fraud Coverage: “The Company shall pay the Parent Corporation
for direct loss sustained by an Insured resulting from Computer Fraud
committed by a Third Party.”

Funds Transfer Fraud Coverage: “The Company shall pay the Parent
Corporation for direct loss sustained by an Insured resulting from Funds
Transfer Fraud committed by a Third Party.”
Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at *1.
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Malaysia and Singapore.57 Following the discovery of the scam, the
client’s bank recovered roughly only $93,000, leaving around
$100,000 of the client’s funds lost to the BEC phishing scheme.58
The client requested and received repayment of the lost funds, and
Taylor & Lieberman sought indemnification of this loss under its
crime insurance policy.59
Both the district court and court of appeals employed various
canons of construction to deny plaintiff’s claim of coverage.60 The
district court relied on existing strategies of coverage interpretation
and classified Taylor & Lieberman’s policy as an “indemnity polic[y]
that [does] not provide third-party coverage . . . [so] [p]laintiff ha[d]
not suffered a ‘direct loss.’” 61 Because the third-party liability
sections were “expressly delineated” and “separated in an entirely
different document,” plaintiff’s claimed coverage provisions, which
made no mention of liability coverage, were construed as indemnity
provisions that did not provide for third-party coverage under the
canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.62
Further, the court applied the whole-text canon to find that the
policy as a whole “more likely contemplate[d] fraudulent violations
against [p]laintiff that result[ed] in a ‘direct loss’ of [p]laintiff’s own
money—not fraudulent violations upon which [p]laintiff relie[d] that
result[ed] in a loss of a [third-party] client’s money.”63 This coverage
57. Id. The fraudster took hold of the client’s email account for use in the first two email requests but
used a different email address in the third request. Id. This final, different request tipped off plaintiff as
to the fraud, and the third wire transfer was not completed. Id.
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *2, *4.
60. See generally Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017); Taylor &
Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130.
61. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *3 (“[M]ost courts . . . have indicated that liability
policies may require an insurer to discharge an obligation of the insured to a third party for some act of
the insured or its employee, while indemnity policies may not.”).
62. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (noting the “canon that expressing one item of a
commonly associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned”); Taylor & Lieberman, 2015
WL 3824130, at *4; Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“A canon of construction . . . express[ing] or includ[ing] one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or
of the alternative.”).
63. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4.
For example, the section of the [p]olicy in question also contains coverage for
employee theft, which is similar in nature to the ‘employee fidelity’ policies
that . . . [do not] require an insurer to discharge an obligation of the insured to a third
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denial left Taylor & Lieberman unreimbursed under the policy even
though it had in good faith repaid the client for the lost funds.64 Such
a result could not only damage the accounting firm’s reputation for
monetary responsibility but also discourage said firm from
distributing repayments to clients ahead of any claim tendered under
its insurance policy. This too could damage the accounting firm’s
relationship with clients; consequently, Taylor & Lieberman
appealed in the hopes of a different outcome.65
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found no coverage for Taylor &
Lieberman via different canons of construction.66 The plaintiff
contended forgery coverage could apply to non-financial instruments,
like emails, based on application of the rule of the last antecedent.67
Under a “natural reading of the policy,” however, coverage logically
extended also to forgery of “financial instruments, like checks, drafts,
or the like,” but not to emails with wire instructions.68 Likewise, the
fraudulent emails neither constituted an unauthorized “entry into” nor
“introduction of instructions” to the plaintiff’s computer system.69
Instead, the ordinary-meaning canon was applied to find that such
computer fraud language is generally understood to cover only
hacking-type attacks, “like the introduction of malicious computer
code” to a computer system, as opposed to just “the text of three
emails.”70 Whereas the Ninth Circuit favors canons of construction to
interpret crime insurance coverage, the Firth Circuit looks to policy
considerations in its decisions.
party for some act of the insured or its employee.
Id. at *3–4; Whole-Text Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine that a legal
text . . . must be construed as a whole.”).
64. Taylor & Lieberman, 2015 WL 3824130, at *4.
65. Taylor & Lieberman, 681 F. App’x at 628.
66. Id. at 628–29.
67. Id. (“The policy provides coverage for an insured’s direct loss ‘resulting from [f]orgery or
alteration of a [f]inancial [i]nstrument by a [t]hird [p]arty.”); Rule of the Last Antecedent, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An interpretive principle by which a court determines that qualifying
words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases
more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing.”).
68. Taylor & Lieberman, 681 F. App’x at 628.
69. Id. at 629.
70. Id.; Ordinary-Meaning Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine that
words in a legal instrument are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings unless the context
indicates that they bear a technical sense or are otherwise defined in the text.”).
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2. Policy Considerations
The Fifth Circuit interprets computer fraud coverage provisions
narrowly.71 In Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., a
petroleum company’s employee received a telephone call from a
purported vendor requesting a change to the bank account details for
invoice payment.72 After the vendor’s follow-up email with attached
instructions on letterhead, as well as the petroleum company’s
internal approval of the change and verification call to the vendor,
millions of dollars were transferred into the new bank account before
the petroleum company discovered this was a fraudulent request.73 In
considering Apache’s claim for coverage under the computer fraud
provision,74 the court viewed Apache’s change-request protocols as
“flawed” and stated that the company could have avoided the fraud
but for a “fail[ure] to investigate accurately the new, but fraudulent,
information provided to it.”75 In this vein, the court declined to find
coverage where the insured’s due diligence investigation could have
uncovered the fraud.76 To find otherwise would be too far-reaching in
“convert[ing] the computer fraud provision to one for general fraud”
since “few—if any—fraudulent schemes would not involve some
form of computer-facilitated communication,” like emails.77 Despite
71. See generally Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016).
72. Id. at 253.
73. Id. at 253–54 (“Apache[, the petroleum company,] received notification [that the vendor] had not
received the £4.3 million (approximately $7 million) Apache had transferred to the new (fraudulent)
account. After an investigation determined the criminals were likely based in Latvia, Apache recouped a
substantial portion of the funds. It contends, however, it suffered a loss, before the $1 million policy
deductible, of approximately £1.5 million (approximately $2.4 million).”).
74. Id. at 254 (“[Great American Insurance Company] will pay for loss of, and loss from damage to,
money, securities and other property resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently
cause a transfer of that property from inside the premises or banking premises . . . to a person (other than
a messenger) outside those premises . . . [or] to a place outside those premises.”).
75. Id. at 258–59 (“Arguably, Apache invited the computer-use at issue . . . [since] [t]he email was
sent only after Apache’s advising, in reply to the criminals’ change-request telephone call, that the
request had to be made on Petrofac letterhead. The criminals complied: by attaching to the email (sent
using a slightly different domain name) a letter on altered letterhead; and, as stated in the email, by
allegedly mailing that letter to Apache. Accordingly, the computer-use was in response to Apache’s
refusing, during the telephone call, to, for example, transcribe the change-request, which it could have
then investigated with its records.”).
76. Id. at 269.
77. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 258; see also Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of
Am., 656 F. App’x 332, 333 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[N]o coverage was afforded under the [c]omputer [f]raud
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these policy considerations that are construed against the insured, the
Second and Sixth Circuits find coverage in favor of the insured on
different grounds.78
B. Phishing Attacks Are Covered
The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts break from their sister
circuits in finding coverage for the policy holder.79 In the Second
Circuit, traditional interpretive tools are disfavored over a modern
examination of the steps to accomplish a phishing attack.80 Similarly,
the Sixth Circuit forgoes a conventional understanding of insurance
contract causation in favor of an expansive interpretation.81 Both
views, however, capture the insured’s conduct and find coverage
under the computer fraud policy.82
1. Technical Interpretations
The Second Circuit reads a computer fraud provision quite literally
to find coverage for the insured.83 Medidata Solutions, Inc. v. Federal
Insurance Co. involved a familiar phishing scheme whereby a
Medidata accounts payable employee was contacted by the company
president with instructions to wire $4.7 million to an external
attorney who was handling a confidential business acquisition.84
After completing this transfer, a second, suspicious wire request
provision for any transfers to [its payroll provider] that were authorized by Pestmaster . . . [since the
policy] require[s] an unauthorized transfer of funds. When [the payroll provider] transferred funds
pursuant to authorization from Pestmaster, the transfer was not fraudulently caused. Because computers
are used in almost every business transaction, reading this provision to cover all transfers that involve
both a computer and fraud at some point in the transaction would convert this [c]rime [p]olicy into a
‘[g]eneral [f]raud’ [p]olicy. While [the insurer] could have drafted this language more narrowly, we
believe protection against all fraud is not what was intended by this provision, and not what Pestmaster
could reasonably have expected this provision to cover.”).
78. See generally Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir.
2018); Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 F. App’x
117 (2d Cir. 2018).
79. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 465; Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 479.
80. Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 477.
81. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 463.
82. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 465; Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 479.
83. Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 477.
84. Id. at 473.
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came through, and Medidata discovered the fraud scheme.85
Medidata sought coverage under the computer fraud provision of
their crime coverage policy.86 The district court, and the Second
Circuit on appeal, found that Medidata’s losses were covered under
the policy since the “fraudsters . . . crafted a computer-based attack
that manipulated [its] email system,” and this constituted an “‘entry
of data into’ [and] ‘change to data elements or program logic of’ a
computer system.”87 Moreover, Medidata also suffered a direct loss
within the meaning of the policy since “the [phishing] attack was the
proximate cause of [the] losses” and the employees’ involvement was
not “sufficient to sever the causal relationship between the [phishing]
attack and the losses incurred.”88
Instead of citing to external policy or maxims of interpretation, the
court focused on the actual, technical method of intrusion to find
coverage.89 The fraudster manipulated the “true origin of the spoofed
emails” by “embedd[ing] a computer code” that caused the electronic
computer system components to display different email address
senders in the “From” field.90 Upon receipt, Medidata’s email system
85. Id. at 473–74.
86. Id. at 474. The policy’s crime coverage section protected an organization from a direct loss of
money resulting from a computer fraud committed by a third party. Id. Computer fraud included the
“unlawful taking or the fraudulently induced transfer of money” as a result of a computer violation. Id.
The policy defined a computer violation as both a fraudulent entry of data into a computer system and a
“change to data elements or program logic of a computer system.” Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 474.
87. Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We agree with the
district court that the plain and unambiguous language of the policy covers the losses incurred by
Medidata here. While Medidata concedes that no hacking occurred, the fraudsters nonetheless crafted a
computer-based attack that manipulated Medidata’s email system, which the parties do not dispute
constitutes a ‘computer system’ within the meaning of the policy. The spoofing code enabled the
fraudsters to send messages that inaccurately appeared, in all respects, to come from a high-ranking
member of Medidata’s organization. Thus the attack represented a fraudulent entry of data into the
computer system, as the spoofing code was introduced into the email system. The attack also made a
change to a data element, as the email system’s appearance was altered by the spoofing code to
misleadingly indicate the sender. Accordingly, Medidata’s losses were covered by the terms of the
computer fraud provision.”).
88. Id. at 119.
89. Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 477.
90. Id. (“[T]he thief constructed messages in Internet Message Format (‘IMF’) which the parties
compare to a physical letter containing a return address. The IMF message was transmitted to Gmail in
an electronic envelope called a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (‘SMTP’). Much like a physical
envelope, the SMTP Envelope contained a recipient and a return address. To mask the true origin of the
spoofed emails, the thief embedded a computer code. The computer code caused the SMTP Envelope
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interpreted the spoofed message as from the company president
rather than the hacker.91 In this way, the court saw the fraudulent
scheme as a change to a data element, since the email system
displayed the incorrect sender because of the computer code, and as
an entry of data element in a computer system because the malicious
computer code was embedded therein.92 According to the Second
Circuit, both phases of the phishing scheme fit squarely within the
policy’s provisions of coverage for the insured.93 The Sixth Circuit
similarly comes down in favor of the insured.94
2. Principles of Causation
The Sixth Circuit employs a causation analysis when interpreting
computer fraud coverage.95 In American Tooling Center, Inc. v.
Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America, a tool and die
manufacturer that outsourced some of its orders to a Chinese
company mistakenly sent an imposter approximately $834,000 in
vendor payments via wire transfer.96 American Tooling claimed the
losses under its computer fraud policy, but Travelers (their insurance
agency) denied the claim.97 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the IMF Letter to display different email addresses in the ‘From’ field. The spoofed emails showed
the thief’s true email address in the SMTP ‘From’ field, and Medidata’s president’s email address in the
IMF ‘From’ field. When Gmail received the spoof emails, the system compared the address in the IMF
‘From’ field with a list of contacts and populated Medidata’s president’s name and picture. The
recipients of the Gmail messages only saw the information in the IMF ‘From’ field.”) (citations
omitted).
91. Id.
92. Medidata, 729 F. App’x at 118.
93. Id.
94. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2018).
95. Id. at 460.
96. Id. at 457–58. (“Gizinski[, American Tooling’s President and Treasurer,] emailed YiFeng
employee Jessie Chen requesting that Chen provide ATC all outstanding invoices. An unidentified third
party, through means unknown, intercepted this email. This third party, impersonating Chen, then began
a correspondence with Gizinski about the outstanding invoices. On March 27, 2015, the impersonator
emailed Gizinski and claimed that, due to an audit, ATC should wire its payments to a different account
from usual. YiFeng had previously (and legitimately) informed ATC it had changed its banking details,
and ATC had no process for verifying the changed information. Consequently, Gizinski wired the
money to the new account.”) (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 458–59 (“The [p]olicy states . . . [that] [t]he [c]ompany will pay the [i]nsured for the
[i]nsured’s direct loss of, or direct loss from damage to . . . [m]oney . . . directly caused by [c]omputer
[f]raud.”).
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reversed the lower court and found coverage for American Tooling
based on principles of causation.98 The court focused on the timing of
the loss, and found “no intervening event” occurred between the
transfer to the fraudster and the point at which the funds were lost.99
Thus, American Tooling suffered a “direct loss” as caused by the
fraudster.100
Equally, the scheme constituted a “computer fraud” within the
meaning of the policy.101 The policy only required that a computer be
used on the one hand, and a fraudulent money transfer be caused on
the other.102 Contrary to Travelers’ suggestion, a computer fraud was
not limited only to scenarios where the phishing scheme fraudulently
caused a computer to make the transfer, such as in a more traditional
hack where “a nefarious party somehow gains access to and/or
controls the insured’s computer.”103 Travelers had not expressly
limited computer fraud coverage to such hacking situations in their
terms of coverage, so the court was not going to read such a

98. Id. at 462–63, 465; see 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.7, Westlaw (database updated 2018)
(“One of the rules most commonly laid down is that damages are not recoverable for injury that is too
remote from the conduct of the defendant constituting his breach of duty. Another form of the rule is
that damages are not recoverable for losses suffered or gains prevented unless the requirements of the
law as to “proximate” causation are satisfied. The form of this rule is the same whether it is being
applied in the field of contracts or in the field of torts, and in both alike, its meaning and its application
are equally indefinite and uncertain.”).
99. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 460.
100. Id. at 459–61. Notably, the court found unpersuasive the suggestion that the loss was only
incurred later in time when the fraud was discovered, not at the moment of payment to the imposter,
because American Tooling “had already contracted with YiFeng to pay that amount of money for the
product it had received ” Id. “This interpretation defies common sense” when viewed against a
“simplified analogy:”
Imagine Alex owes Blair five dollars. Alex reaches into her purse and pulls out a fivedollar bill. As she is about to hand Blair the money, Casey runs by and snatches the
bill from Alex’s fingers. Travelers’ theory would have us say that Casey caused no
direct loss to Alex because Alex owed that money to Blair and was preparing to hand
him the five-dollar bill.
Id.
101. Id. at 461 (“The [p]olicy specifically defines the term . . . [c]omputer [f]raud [to mean] [t]he use
of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of [m]oney . . . from inside the . . . [f]inancial
[i]nstitution [p]remises . . . to a person . . . outside the [f]inancial [i]nstitution [p]remises . . . [or] to a
place outside the . . . [f]inancial [i]nstitution [p]remises.”).
102. Id.
103. Am. Tooling Ctr., 895 F.3d at 461–62.
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restriction into the policy; thus, the door was left open concerning
coverage of BECs.104
It is not enough, however, for there to be a direct loss and a
computer fraud. The company must also demonstrate, as per the
policy language, that “its ‘direct loss’ was ‘directly caused by’ the
computer fraud.”105 The Sixth Circuit, borrowing a test from the
Eleventh Circuit, deemed the computer fraud to have directly caused
the direct loss when the loss was incurred immediately after wiring
the funds to the impersonator pursuant to the fraudulent email.106
Interestingly, the company’s “internal actions” were not found to
break the causal chain between the fraudulent emails and the loss,
suggesting that, in the Sixth Circuit at least, external steps taken by
the company between the fraudulent act and the loss incurred could
produce contrary results.107
C. The Eleventh Circuit’s View
The Eleventh Circuit has also opined on the issue with mixed
results. On the one hand, it employs the same causation test as the
Sixth Circuit, but comes to a different result that favors the insurer.108
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit also adopts a cause-in-fact
104. Id. at 462 (“If Travelers had wished to limit the definition of computer fraud to such criminal
behavior it could have done so. Cf. Citizens Ins. v. Pro-Seal Serv. Grp., 730 N.W.2d 682, 686 (2007)
(holding that a contract is construed in favor of the insured if there is an ambiguity). Because Travelers
did not do so, the third party’s fraudulent scheme in this case constitutes ‘Computer Fraud’ per the
Policy’s definition.”).
105. Id. at 462.
106. Id. at 463 (“[American Tooling] received the fraudulent email at step one. [Its] employees then
conducted a series of internal actions, all induced by the fraudulent email, which led to the transfer of
the money to the impersonator at step two. This was ‘the point of no return,’ because the loss occurred
once [American Tooling] transferred the money in response to the fraudulent emails. Thus, the computer
fraud ‘directly caused’ [American Tooling’s] ‘direct loss.’”).
107. Id. at 462 (“The chain of events that was precipitated by the fraudulent emails and led to the wire
transfers involved multiple internal actions at [American Tooling]. After receiving each fraudulent
email, [American Tooling] verified that YiFeng had completed the tasks required for the next scheduled
payment. Gizinski subsequently determined which outstanding invoices to pay, and chose to pay the
YiFeng invoice. He then signed into the banking portal and manually entered the fraudulent banking
information emailed by the impersonator. Finally, after Gizinski submitted the wire transfer, [American
Tooling’s] Assistant Comptroller approved the payment. [American Tooling] thus suffered its loss
immediately after the transfer, which marked the end of the ‘Computer Fraud’ as defined in the policy.”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
108. Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 936 (11th Cir. 2018).
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approach that aligns with the insured’s claim for coverage.109 This
intra-circuit split further highlights the divide amongst the courts.
1. The Point of No Return Test
As in the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit decides phishing
attack coverage disputes based on principles of causation in light of
the link between the fraud and the loss.110 This link proved too
remote in Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Great
American Insurance Co. where a chit retailer was defrauded out of
$11.4 million after thieves found a way to redeem a single chit
multiple times.111 The insured, Interactive Communications, held a
standard computer fraud policy with Great American Insurance,112
but the court adopted a plain meaning of the word “directly”113 to
find that the loss came only after the “fraudsters . . . set into motion
[a] chain of events.”114 Unfortunately for Interactive
Communications, the fraudsters’ chit manipulation occurred at “Step
109. Id. at 933–36; But-For Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without
which the event could not have occurred.”).
110. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 935–36; Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at *4, *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016).
111. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 930–32; see also Joshua Davey & Kevin Denny, Federal Court:
Computer Fraud Provision Does Not Cover Fraudulent Debit Card Transactions Conducted Over the
Telephone,
MCGUIREWOODS
INS.
RECOVERY
BLOG
(Apr.
12,
2017),
https://www.insurancerecoveryblog.com/2017/04/federal-court-computer-fraud-provision-does-notcover-fraudulent-debit-card-transactions-conducted-over-the-telephone/ [https://perma.cc/LF5Q-BYQ7]
(“The insured, InComm Holdings, processes debit cards that allow consumers to purchase credits, called
‘chits,’ from retailers, which can then be redeemed for actual dollars that are loaded onto prepaid debit
cards to make everyday purchases. InComm’s redemption program works as follows: Third-party banks
issue prepaid debit cards to consumers. Consumers buy ‘chits’ from retailers like CVS or Walgreens for
the value of the chit plus a service fee. Each chit represents the amount purchased, i.e., a $100 chit
represents $100. The retailer then wires the consumer’s funds to InComm. To convert chits to actual
dollars on the debit cards, a consumer calls InComm and uses voice or touchtone commands to ‘redeem’
the chits. After a chit is redeemed, InComm wires the amount of the chit to the bank that issued the debit
card, and the funds become available for the consumer’s use.”).
112. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 931 (“[T]he policy provides coverage for ‘loss of, and loss from
damage to, money, securities and other property resulting directly from the use of any computer to
fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the premises or banking premises: (a) to a
person (other than a messenger) outside those premises; or (b) to a place outside those premises.’”)
(emphasis added).
113. Id. at 934 (“In accordance with the term’s ordinary meaning, we hold that . . . one thing results
‘directly’ from another if it follows straightaway, immediately, and without any intervention or
interruption.”).
114. Id.
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1,” but the funds were not lost until “Step 4,” and, as such, the “use
of . . . computers did not . . . immediately . . . cause [the] loss.”115
The Eleventh Circuit formulated a “point of no return” test
whereby, for computer fraud policy purposes, a loss occurs at the
point in time when the insured loses control over the funds.116 If this
dominion is lost immediately following that fraudulent act, such as
the use of a computer, the loss will “result [ ] directly” from the
fraudulent activity.117 Otherwise, where there are intervening “steps,
acts, [or] actors,” the loss is too remote from the fraud to be covered
under a standard computer fraud policy.118 Accordingly, the court
uses a strict causation standard where virtually any intervening steps
between the fraud and the loss, irrespective of their impetus or who
performs the step, will break the causal chain such that the insured
may not recover under the policy.119 Another decision within this
circuit, however, relaxes this causation standard.120
2. But for Causation Test
The Eleventh Circuit has also interpreted a computer fraud policy
using a “‘but for’ test.”121 Success Healthcare, LLC v. Zurich
American Insurance Co. involved a payroll director who obtained
Success’s electronic signature to fraudulently wire more than $10
million away from the company.122 Zurich American denied
coverage under the policy123 citing, in pertinent part, that the “theft
was not ‘directly related to’ the use of a computer.”124 Success sued
115. Id.
116. Id. at 935 (“InComm retained at least some control over the funds . . . even after [Step 2] . . . and
could prevent their loss by intervening to halt the disbursement of money ........ ”).
117. Id.
118. Interactive, 731 F. App’x at 935.
119. Id.
120. See generally Success Healthcare v. Zurich Am. Ins., No. 9:14 81423-CIV, 2015 WL 11439019
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2015 WL 11438207 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2015).
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id. at *5 (“[T]he [p]olicy provides coverage for....... ’[c]omputer [f]raud,’ which is defined in
relevant part to be ‘theft of property following and directly related to the use of any computer to
fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside .......the ‘premises’ or ‘banking premises’ to a
person ...... outside those ‘premises’ or to a place outside those ‘premises.’”) (citation omitted).
124. Id. at *6.
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for breach of contract, and the court resolved this issue by invoking a
rudimentary but for test for causation—but for the payroll director’s
use of a computer, the fraud would not have occurred.125 This
formulation was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,126 but it
unfortunately brought no interpretive uniformity to the computer
fraud coverage arena. The following proposal suggests a remedy in
this regard.
III. Proposal
A common theme among the prevailing case law is the insurer’s
initial denial of coverage under the computer fraud provision of the
crime insurance policy.127 This clash is seemingly ingrained into the
professional relationship as insurance companies seek to keep down
their bottom line by limiting claim payments and, in contrast, the
insured looks to avoid the risk that the insured believes the policy
was meant to protect against in the first place.128 An ideal proposal to
bridge this coverage gap is for insurers, in recognition of BEC
prevalence, to uniformly spell out the types of coverages that are and
are not envisioned by the policy.129 This ensures that both parties
have a meeting of the minds regarding the contractual coverages of
the policy. This solution may avoid coverage disputes for future
policy holders, but it does not address the inevitable disagreements
between current policy holders and the coverages available under
125. Id.
126. Success Healthcare, 2015 WL 11439019, at *7.
127. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2018);
Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2018); Interactive Commc’ns Int’l
v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 932 (11th Cir. 2018); Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F.
App’x 627, 627 (9th Cir. 2017); Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 254 (5th Cir.
2016); Success, 2015 WL 11439019, at *1.
128. Duncan Minty, Ethics and Insurance Claims—Part 3—Addressing Conflicts of Interest, ETHICS
AND INS. (June 18, 2013), https://ethicsandinsurance.info/2013/06/18/ethics-claims-3-conflicts-ofinterest/ [https://perma.cc/CD5F-JH8G]; What to Do if Your Business Insurance Claim is Denied,
FINDLAW,
https://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/liability-and-insurance/what-to-do-if-your-businessinsurance-claim-is-denied.html [https://perma.cc/TA36-EXFW] (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
129. Bill Wilson, Resolving Insurance Coverage and Claim Disputes, PROPERTYCASUALTY360 (Aug.
14, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2018/08/14/resolving-insurance-coverageand-claim-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/Z8PQ-5EQR] (“[T]he best way to [avoid a] dispute [is] to have
addressed the issue at policy inception.”).
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existing, standard computer fraud provision language. This resolution
will be dependent on uniformity in judicial interpretation so that
insureds can predict coverage gaps and acquire additional protection
as required. Similarly, insurers can update their policy language and
offerings in line with this uniform interpretation so that fewer claims
and coverage disputes arise. While the facts of each claim vary,
insurance disputes over phishing attacks are best adjudicated using a
hybrid scheme that incorporates the Fifth Circuit’s theory of
accountability with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit’s temporal
causation analysis.
A. Accountability
Accountability as a judicial consideration can influence the insurer
and insured alike. For the policy holder, the knowledge that the
measures taken to detect and mitigate a phishing attack will be
considered in a coverage dispute may induce the insured to increase
security measures ahead of any potential attack. Indeed, cyber
security experts call for this type of preparedness irrespective of any
insurance policy language.130 Partnering sound cyber security
130. Joanna Belbey, How to Avoid Cyber Attacks: 5 Best Practices From SEC and FINRA, FORBES
(June 30, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joannabelbey/2017/06/30/how-to-avoidcyberattacks-5-best-practices-from-sec-and-finra/#3bbb09021a16
[https://perma.cc/KD2T-RC9S]
(noting that governance, risk assessment, cybersecurity training, access management, and vendor
management are among the best ways to educate about and defend against cyber risks); Business Email
Compromise: The 3.1 Billion Dollar Scam, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 14, 2016),
https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160614.aspx [https://perma.cc/922X-5DJE] (“Businesses with an
increased awareness and understanding of the BEC scam are more likely to recognize when they have
been targeted by BEC fraudsters, and are therefore more likely to avoid falling victim and sending
fraudulent payments. Businesses that deploy robust internal prevention techniques at all levels
(especially targeting front line employees who may be the recipients of initial phishing attempts), have
proven highly successful in recognizing and deflecting BEC attempts. Some financial institutions
reported holding their customer requests for international wire transfers for an additional period of time,
to verify the legitimacy of the request
Avoid free web-based e-mail accounts: Establish a company
domain name and use it to establish company e-mail accounts in lieu of free, web-based accounts. Be
careful what is posted to social media and company websites, especially job duties/descriptions,
hierarchal information, and out of office details. Be suspicious of requests for secrecy or pressure to take
action quickly. Consider additional IT and financial security procedures, including the implementation
of a 2-step verification process . . . . Significant Changes: Beware of sudden changes in business
practices. For example, if a current business contact suddenly asks to be contacted via their personal email address when all previous official correspondence has been through company e-mail, the request
could be fraudulent. Always verify via other channels that you are still communicating with your
legitimate business partner . . . . Verify changes in vendor payment location by adding additional
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prevention with judicial notice of those procedures can result in
fewer successful phishing attacks against the insured and, if a
coverage dispute does arise, can ensure that the policy holder is not
abusing the computer fraud protection by seeking “shelter” as a
“provision . . . for general fraud.”131 Similarly, insurance companies
would see benefits when courts favor responsible cyber security
protocols.
Risk management is central to the insurance industry.132 Insurers
measure various factors in determining the premium to charge a
policy holder or whether to offer any coverage at all.133 In the cyber
policy arena, insurers typically require that potential insureds
produce a security assessment of their cyber defenses.134 With the
relevant factors in mind, insurers determine individual or business
premiums based on “how much cost will be involved in paying

two-factor authentication such as having a secondary sign-off by company personnel. Confirm requests
for transfers of funds. When using phone verification as part of the two-factor authentication, use
previously known numbers, not the numbers provided in the e-mail request. Know the habits of your
customers, including the details of, reasons behind, and amount of payments. Carefully scrutinize all email requests for transfers of funds to determine if the requests are out of the ordinary.”); Security 101:
Business Email Compromise (BEC) Schemes, TREND MICRO (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/business-emailcompromise-bec-schemes [https://perma.cc/X9Y4-BEKS] (“Businesses are advised to stay vigilant and
educate employees on how to prevent being victimized by [BEC] scams and . . . here are some tips on
how to stay protected and secure: Carefully scrutinize all emails. Be wary of irregular emails that are
sent from C-suite executives, as they are used to trick employees into acting with urgency. Review
emails that request transfer of funds to determine if the requests are irregular[; e]ducate and train
employees. While employees are a company’s biggest asset, they’re also usually its weakest link when it
comes to security. Commit to training employees according to the company’s best practices. Remind
them that adhering to company policies is one thing, but developing good security habits is
another[; v]erify any changes in vendor payment location by using a secondary sign-off by company
personnel[; s]tay updated on your customers’ habits including the details, and reasons behind
payments[; c]onfirm requests for transfer of funds when using phone verification as part of two-factor
authentication, use known familiar numbers, not the details provided in the email requests.”).
131. Apache, 662 F. App’x at 258–59.
132. Paul Kaye, Risk Measurement in Insurance, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y (2005),
https://www.casact.org/pubs/dpp/dpp05/05dpp1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2UP-ATWS].
133. Michelle Boardman, Risk Data in Insurance Interpretation, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 157, 162–63
(2009); Mila Araujo, What Is an Insurance Premium (and How Does It Work)?, BALANCE (July 9,
2018), https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-what-is-an-insurance-premium-4155239
[https://perma.cc/Z3R4-L3DS]. The type and amount of coverage sought determines the premium. Id.
Likewise, personal information “from credit rating to car accident frequency or personal claims history
and even occupation” play a role in premium pricing. Id.
134. Mark Lanterman, Managing Cyber Risk: Is Cyber Liability Insurance Important for Law Firms?,
75 BENCH & B. MINN. 13, 14 (2018).
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claims as well as how much money the insurance company should
collect in order to make sure that they make enough money to pay
potential claims.”135 Judicial emphasis on cyber accountability would
then incentivize “cultures of security,” resulting in less claims under
the policy.136 Over time, fewer BEC claims would lessen the risk and
cost to insure, resulting in a net benefit to all stakeholders.137 This
principle, coupled with a court’s temporal causation standard, would
yield the best outcome in computer fraud coverage disputes.
B. Temporal Causation
Unsurprisingly, when coverage disputes arise, the insured will
seek an expansive definition of “direct loss,” where a sequence of
events does not break the chain of causation between the claimed loss
and the computer fraud, and the insured will insist upon an unbroken
link between the loss and fraud.138 While the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits apply the latter interpretation to computer fraud
provisions,139 a majority of jurisdictions see “direct [as] direct” in
similar policy language that provides coverage against employee
theft.140 Regardless of the type of covered loss, insurance policies
routinely include language such as “direct loss” or “loss resulting
135. Araujo, supra note 133.
136. Lanterman, supra note 134.
137. Chubb Launches Online Cyber Risk Index, INS. J.
(Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/04/12/486335.htm
[https://perma.cc/NY5EJATP]. Global insurance provider Chubb subscribes to this culture of cyber threat prevention by
“offer[ing] businesses throughout North America [an online index that] provide[s] insight into real
threats facing them on a daily basis.” Id. Chubb understands that “[t]he first step to protecting a business
from a cyber attack is staying aware of what threats are most prominent to a company’s size and
industry [and] . . . help[ing] users to better understand their exposures and manage risk before a cyber
incident occurs.” Id.
138. Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at
*5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016) (“It is reasonable for [the insured] to interpret the language of the policy to
provide coverage even if there were intervening events between the fraud and the loss. [The insurer’s]
interpretation, which would require an immediate link between the injury and its cause, is also
reasonable.”).
139. Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2018);
Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 934 (11th Cir. 2018).
140. Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 665, 674 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Other jurisdictions have considered the meaning of the word in the context of similar insurance
policies. The weight of the authorities define ‘directly’ as meaning ‘immediate’—known by some as the
‘direct is direct’ approach—although other jurisdictions espouse a ‘proximate cause’ approach.”).
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directly from,” and state and federal circuit courts around the country
have predominantly adopted a direct, immediate understanding of
causation when adjudicating coverage disputes.141 For purposes of
promoting uniformity and predictability, courts should apply the
direct causation approach when deciding computer fraud coverage
cases. There are, however, additional considerations that make this
the best approach.
1. Intent of the Parties
Limiting covered losses to those that immediately follow the fraud
not only comports with the plain meaning of the term,142 but this
approach also aligns with the intent of the parties at the time of
contract formation.143 None of the policies in question expressly
define the sorts of losses covered when a direct loss of money is
caused by a computer fraud. Hence, where the “terms of the [policy]
itself” do not clearly indicate the parties’ understanding, courts can
look to a “body of law or an established custom or usage” to provide
a definition.144 Because a majority of courts, both federal and state,
subscribe to the immediate causation standard,145 the parties’ intent
may be inferred as aligning with this common understanding.146
141. David Spielbauer & Shane Mecham, Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc: A Fifty-State Survey of
Causation in Fidelity Bonds, 22 FIDELITY L.J. 265, 266 (2016) (“Unfortunately, not all courts agree on
what the phrase ‘loss resulting directly from’ means. The majority rule and modern trend is for courts to
enforce the plain language of the contract and conclude that the [policy] unambiguously requires the
loss to be ‘direct’ or immediate. Intervening and superseding acts break the causal chain. A minority of
courts . . . interpret the [policy’s] ‘direct loss’ language to mean ‘proximate cause’ or ‘but for’
causation.”); Id. at 281 (noting that thirty-three of fifty states and eight of eleven federal circuits follow
the direct causation approach).
142. Direct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Free from extraneous influence;
immediate.”).
143. Beazley Ins. Co. Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 880 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A]n insurance
contract is interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the clear language of the
contract.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
144. Id. (“In assessing whether there is [ ] a prevailing federal definition, we consider not whether
there is complete unanimity among the courts that have addressed the question, but rather whether there
is an overwhelming current of judicial opinion, that is, a meaning used by the vast majority of federal
courts.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
145. See discussion infra Section III.B.
146. Beazley, 880 F.3d at 70 (“Federal case law is simply another way of determining whether the
parties shared a common language that would lead them to a mutual, unambiguous understanding of the
meaning of an undefined term.”).
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Certainly, parties could draft policy language more clearly, but
absent these specific provisions, the “ordinary and popular sense” is
deemed to be its intended definition.147
2. Reasonable Expectations
The temporal causation analysis is also superior because of the
parties’ reasonable coverage expectations. Computer fraud policies
typically cover traditional hacking where a person “surreptitiously
break[s] into the computer, network, servers, or database of another
person or organization.”148 Though insureds “have tried to extend
hacking coverage to instances in which criminals give bad
information that is then legally entered into the policy holder’s
computer,” policy coverage is generally understood to apply where a
third party carries out the computer fraud.149 Indeed, many insurance
companies offer a social engineering fraud coverage extension or
endorsement that specifically applies to BEC schemes where an
authorized company employee ultimately executes the wire transfer
based on fraudulent instructions.150 Based on the contract
147. Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We interpret
words in accordance with their ordinary and popular sense, unless the words are used in a technical
sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage.”) (quoting Emp’rs Reinsurance Co. v. Superior
Court, 161 Cal. App. 4th 906, 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)).
148. Hack, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Alan Rutkin, Cyber-Crimes: How Have
Courts Dealt with the Insurance Implications of This Emerging Risk?, AM. C. COVERAGE &
EXTRACONTRACTUAL
COUNS.
(2016),
https://coverage.memberclicks.net/assets/Documents/accec_2016_annualmeeting_attendeematerials_we
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7H7-DLCA].
149. Rutkin, supra note 148.
150. Lynda Bennett, Beware of Coverage Gaps for Social Engineering Losses, RISK MGMT.
MONITOR (May 23, 2016), https://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/beware-of-coverage-gaps/
[https://perma.cc/DH9H-3SM2] (“Given the prevalence of social engineering claims and the clear
market for companies looking to insure against such risks, some insurers have begun to offer an
endorsement that provides coverage for social engineering claims.”); Social Engineering Fraud
Coverage for Crime Insurance, CHUBB, https://www.chubb.com/ca-en/business-insurance/socialengineering-fraud-coverage-for-crime-insurance.aspx [https://perma.cc/SJW2-4QHE] (last visited Sept.
17, 2019) (“The Social Engineering Fraud Endorsement insures a range of social engineering fraud
losses when added to a Chubb Crime Insurance policy, including . . . [v]endor or supplier
imitation . . . [e]xecutive imitation . . . [and] [c]lient imitation.”); Social Engineering Fraud
Endorsement,
TRAVELERS
INDEMNITY
C O.
(2016),
https://www.travelers.com/iwdocuments/professional-liability-insurance/CP-8697-social-engineering-fraud.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33RL-L569] (“That is why Travelers is offering an endorsement with a social
engineering fraud insuring agreement for Wrap+ and Executive Choice+ Fidelity and Crime coverages.
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interpretation maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,151 the lack
of specific policy language purporting to cover phishing attacks
supports the interpretation that such attacks are not covered, meaning
the insurer and insured alike could not “reasonably have expected
this provision to cover” BECs at the time of contract formation.152
C. Same and Different Results Under This Proposal
Following the “direct is direct” approach tends to narrowly
interpret the sequence of events that may transpire and still provide
for computer fraud coverage.153 Yet, when “direct [means] direct” in
the policy language, a “temporally remote” loss is necessarily
excluded.154 Employing the Eleventh Circuit’s step-by-step analysis
to a coverage dispute helps delineate when losses are direct or
remote. In Brightpoint, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., for
example, Brightpoint, the plaintiff, received a known purchaser’s fax
requesting $1.5 million worth of prepaid phone cards.155 Brightpoint
complied but later discovered that the purchase documentation was
fraudulent, and the cards were never recovered.156 Brightpoint then
tendered a claim under its crime insurance policy and later brought
suit after the insurer denied coverage.157 The court ultimately found
for the insurer because lost property was not inside Brightpoint’s
premises when the fraud occurred and because the fax did not
“‘fraudulently cause[] a transfer’ of the phone cards.”158 However,

Traditional Fidelity and Crime insurance policies often limit losses to fraud schemes that a business is
unaware of and is not an active participant in the scheme. This endorsement specifically extends
coverage to include instances of social engineering fraud perpetrated by a purported vendor, client,
employee or authorized person.”).
151. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, supra note 62.
152. Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 656 F. App’x 332, 333 (9th Cir.
2016).
153. Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 665, 674 (6th Cir. 2012).
154. Interactive Commc’ns Int’l v. Great Am. Ins., 731 F. App’x 929, 935 (11th Cir. 2018); Tooling,
Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 674.
155. Brightpoint, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:04-CV-2085-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 693377, at *2–
3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006).
156. Id. at *3.
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *6–7.
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the temporal causation analysis could have produced similar results
as well.
In Brightpoint, the plaintiff received the fraudulent fax at step
one.159 At step two, Brightpoint sent an employee to a separate
company from which Brightpoint purchased its phone cards.160 This
company employee then turned the phone cards over to the
fraudulent buyer at step three.161 It is at this point that Brightpoint
lost control of the property, and thus the loss did not flow directly
from the fraudulent fax at step one.162 Other cases are similarly
illustrative.
Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of
America involved a seafood importer who was defrauded out of
$713,890 when a hacker, posing as a vendor, requested new wire
instructions via spoofed emails.163 The court found a voluntary
transfer provision controlling, but the temporal causation analysis
would have sufficed as well.164 In this case, Aqua Star received the
fraudulent emails at step one.165 The recipient employee, following
company protocol, then “printed out a copy of the spreadsheet [with
the fraudulent wiring instructions therein] and included it in a
package of documents that was presented to a member of Aqua Star’s
159. Id. at *2 (“On both January 23 and 24, 2003, by facsimile, Brightpoint received copies of
purchase orders, post-dated checks, and bank guaranties believed to be from or authorized by Genato.”).
160. Id. (“After Brightpoint received these faxed documents on both January 23 and 24, 2003, it sent
an employee, Jay-Jay N. Moralde, to the main office of Globe Telecom (‘Globe’), the company from
which Brightpoint purchased the cards to be distributed to Genato.”).
161. Brightpoint, 2006 WL 693377, at *2 (“At a location just outside Globe’s building, and after
receipt of the originals of the post-dated checks and bank guaranties that had earlier been faxed to
Brightpoint, Moralde turned over the phone cards he had purchased from Globe. The exchange was
made with Reena Aldeguer, a person who had attended other similar exchanges and who was believed
to be a representative of Genato.”).
162. Id. at *7.
163. Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. C14-1368RSL, 2016 WL
3655265, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2016), aff’d, 719 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2018).
164. Aqua Star, 719 F. App’x at 702 (“Exclusion G unambiguously provides that the policy ‘will not
apply to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of Electronic Data by a natural
person having the authority to enter the Insured’s Computer System[.]’ Aqua Star’s losses resulted from
employees authorized to enter its computer system changing wiring information and sending four
payments to a fraudster’s account. These employees ‘ha[d] the authority to enter’ Aqua Star’s system
when they ‘input’ Electronic Data, on Aqua Star computers, to change the wiring information and
authorize the four wires. Their conduct fits squarely within the Exclusion. While other contractual
exclusions may also bar coverage in this case, we need not go any further.”) (citations omitted).
165. Aqua Star, 2016 WL 3655265, at *1.
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management for approval of the payment.”166 This constituted step
two. At step three, presumably following management’s approval,
the employee completed “four payments to a fraudster’s account.”167
Here, again, an intervening step between the fraud and the loss would
have provided a sufficient basis to deny coverage under the computer
fraud provision, irrespective of any policy exclusions.
Under this proposal, American Tooling Center, Inc. v. Travelers
Casualty and Surety Co. of America would come out differently. In
American Tooling Center, the court noted that the plaintiff “received
the fraudulent email at step one.”168 Yet, the “internal actions” of the
employees that ultimately authorized the wire transfer were not
deemed to be intervening steps between the email at step one and the
loss of the funds at the final step.169 A better approach is to classify
the phishing attack from beginning to end and determine the steps
involved to get from the fraudster’s initial attack to the ultimate loss
of control of the property or money. Any steps between these two
points in time, whether inside or outside the company, would sever
the causal relationship and not be a direct loss under the policy.
This strict policy interpretation appears to favor insurers on its
face, but in practice it would promote insured awareness and
diligence in identifying coverage gaps. Tying back to accountability,
this approach would put insureds on notice regarding their security
policies and how the steps between initiation and completion of a
phishing attack may preclude computer fraud coverage. However,
upon receipt of a suspicious email or other electronic communication,
the policy holder will ideally discover and thwart the attack ahead of
any loss—as prompted by the courts’ uniform application of a
computer fraud policy.

166.
167.
168.
169.
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Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2018).
Id.

29

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5

436

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

CONCLUSION
Insurance companies and policy holders face an uncertain future
given the bombardment of new and emerging cyber threats.
Sophisticated email phishing attacks in particular have cost
businesses hundreds of thousands, even millions, of dollars in
fraudulent wire transfers.170 Coverage decisions under a computer
fraud policy have (to this point) been inconsistent in the federal
circuit courts. To resolve this circuit split, a uniform interpretation is
proposed that fosters the insured’s threat detection and prevention
and keeps with traditional readings of insurance policies. These
factors can work in parallel to keep businesses safe and encourage
harmony and—importantly—predictability between insurer and
insured.

170. Matthews, supra note 28.
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